O i l An a l yst

2 0 24 O i l O u t l o o k : R o b u st R et u rn s i n th e O P E C R a n g e

Oil prices are down slightly this year despite demand exceeding our optimistic expectations. Non-core OPEC supply has been much stronger than expected, partly offset by OPEC cuts. We believe that one-off factors drove the supply beats, concentrated in the US (easing constraints), Russia and Iran (policy).

We expect demand growth to remain solid and core OPEC supply to remain low in 2024. We thus expect the oil market to tighten at a moderate pace, but preserve significant spare capacity to handle tightening shocks, which effectively delays the super cycle.

Callum Bruce, CFA +1(212)902-3053 | callum.bruce@gs.com Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby +1(646)446-3905 | yulia.grigsby@gs.com Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

Blake Woods +1(972)368-9739 | blake.woods@gs.com Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

We believe that OPEC will ensure Brent in a \$80-\$100 range by leveraging its pricing power, with a \$80 floor from the OPEC put, and a \$100 ceiling from spare capacity. While higher non-OPEC supply or lower GDP are downside risks to prices, we estimate that Brent would remain close to \$80 unless OPEC became less assertive. This range should offer robust spot (15% over 12M) and carry (12%) returns, and we also see hedging value against geopolitical supply shocks.

We expect that a 0.7mb/d deficit will raise Brent to a 2024 average of \$92/bbl. We see solid 1.6mb/d demand growth given solid GDP growth, structural EM increases, and a jet fuel recovery. US supply growth is set to slow given falling rigs, capital discipline, and soft productivity. We assume a gradual unwind of the extra Saudi cut, and extended group cuts because they support revenues.

Daan Struyven +1(212)357-4172 | daan.struyven@gs.com Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

While there is ample spare capacity in oil production, we expect refining to remain structurally tight. We thus expect complex refinery margins to rise, especially for gasoline as high octane inputs get scarce again in summer.

Top trades:

OPEC Range: Profit if Jun24 Brent is above 75; short put, long call spread 2024 Deficits: Long Aug24/Sep24 Brent timespread Summer Gasoline Tightness: Long Sum24 Europe Gasoline-Brent crack

This report is intended for distribution to GS institutional clients only.

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We Expect Oil Prices in a \$80-100 Range

Source: ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

2024 Outlook: Robust Returns in the OPEC Range

Following the latest selloff, Brent oil prices are down slightly year-to-date despite demand exceeding even our own optimistic expectations. In fact, we estimate that oil demand growth of 2.5mb/d this year is on track to exceed the IEA and even our own optimistic expectations as of a year ago by 800 and 500kb/d, respectively (Exhibit 1, left panel). The key surprise has been much stronger than expected non core OPEC production, partly offset by core OPEC supply cuts.

We believe that two one off factors drove the upside surprises to supply outside of core OPEC, concentrated among a few countries. First, the post-pandemic easing in supply constraints for rigs, parts, and workers, and related efficiency gains have provided a one-time boost to US production growth.1 Second, supply from certain sanctioned economies has exceeded expectations in 2023 as Western policymakers fought the energy crisis with a price cap keeping Russian barrels on the market while rising Iranian exports unlocked productive capacity.

Exhibit 1: Upside Surprises in 2023 To Oil Demand and Non-OPEC Supply

Source: IEA, Kpler, JODI, EIA, National Sources, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

As both factors are unlikely to boost supply growth much further, we expect supply growth outside core OPEC to slow to 1.5mb/d in 2024 (vs. 2.6mb/d in 2023), especially in the US. We, however, expect demand growth to remain solid (1.6mb/d yoy) and core OPEC supply to remain low in 2024 (-0.3mb/d yoy), as we believe that OPEC’s more assertive market management is structural. On net, we expect a moderate 0.7mb/d deficit in 2024, slightly wider than the 0.3mb/d deficit in 2023.

We thus expect the oil market—which is now only slightly tighter than usual based on the level of OECD commercial stocks—to tighten at a moderate pace, but preserve significant spare capacity to handle near-term tightening shocks. While this spare

capacity effectively delays the next oil super cycle, it doesn’t necessarily prevent it, given how tight long-term supply drivers of future tightness (e.g. capex) still look (Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2: We Expect the Oil Market to Tighten in 2024 But to Preserve Significant Spare Capacity

Source: IEA, Platts, OPEC, EIA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

The OPEC Range

We believe that OPEC will ensure that Brent oil prices end up in a \$80-\$100 range in 2024 by ensuring a moderate deficit and leveraging its pricing power. This range should offer investors robust spot and carry returns in most scenarios. At the same time, we also see hedging value in oil in risk scenarios with geopolitically driven supply disruptions, where risk assets perform poorly.

Exhibit 3: We Expect Oil Prices to Stay in a \$80-100 Range

Source: ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

A \$80 Floor Under Brent

We believe that Brent is unlikely to sustainably drop below \$80/bbl next year for three reasons.

First, the OPEC put is likely to stay in place. The cuts in October 2022, April and June 2023, and the September extension of the extra Saudi cut suggest that the OPEC put sits at \$80 to \$85/bbl (Exhibit 4). While the rise in spare capacity implies that this put is less strong than a year ago, we believe that a sustained drop below \$80 would likely lead OPEC+ to bring back barrels more slowly.

Second, the global economy is approaching a soft landing, where core inflation returns to target with limited damage to labor or oil demand.

Third, US net public and private demand for oil rises when prices fall. The US Department of Energy reiterated its commitment to replenish the SPR as an incremental price-sensitive buyer, and aims to purchase up to 6mb of oil in January at WTI of \$79/bbl or below. And we estimate that a 10% oil price decrease lowers US liquids supply by around 1% or 200kb/d.

Exhibit 4: The OPEC Put Currently Appears to Sit Around \$80 to \$85/bbl

Green bars refer to the unilateral Saudi cut or its extension.
Source: OPEC, ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

A \$100 Cap on Brent

We believe that Brent is unlikely to sustainably exceed around \$100/bbl next year for three reasons.

First, high spare capacity of 6mb/d limits the upside to long-dated oil prices (Exhibit 5, left panel). With ample spare capacity, long-dated prices do not need to increase to encourage faster growth in long-cycle projects, and we still estimate the fair value for 36m Brent at \$74/bbl.

Second, OPEC is unlikely to push timespreads to extreme levels, which would reduce long-term residual demand for OPEC barrels. Specifically, we find that the 2022 energy crisis boosted long-run non-OPEC supply via a return to offshore growth, and lowered long-run oil demand via investment in alternatives to oil, including EVs.

Third, the destocking in China crude inventories and the hit to crude demand from eroding refinery margins following the rise in Brent to nearly \$100/bbl in late September illustrate price-elastic crude demand from China and refiners as a key balancing mechanism.

Exhibit 5: Elevated Spare Capacity and China Destocking Put a Cap on Oil Prices

Source: Platts, IEA, OPEC, EIA, Kpler, ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

As Brent prices are likely to recover to the upper half of the 80-100 range, oil should offer robust spot returns. We also believe that OPEC will pursue backwardation, and anticipate that an elevated 12% roll or carry return will be a large contributor to our forecast of a 36% total return for Brent over the next 12M. We next review the key drivers of our forecast of a moderate deficit in 2024.

Exhibit 6: We Forecast Robust Returns From Investing in Brent Futures From Price Appreciation and Roll Return

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

A Moderate Deficit in 2024

We expect that robust demand, slowing US supply growth, and lower OPEC supply for longer will result in a moderate 0.7mb/d 2024 deficit. As a result, we expect that gentle inventory declines (Exhibit 7) will raise timespreads and Brent to a peak of \$95/bbl by August 2024, with the 2024 average at \$92/bbl.2

Exhibit 7: We Forecast Gentle Inventory Declines in 2024

Source: IEA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Deficit Driver #1: Robust Demand Growth

We see solid 1.6mb/d oil demand growth in 2024 given solid global GDP growth, structural EM increases, and an ongoing jet fuel recovery.

Our economists forecast above-consensus global GDP growth of 2.6% based on strong income growth, a smaller drag from monetary and fiscal tightening, a recovery in manufacturing activity, and an increased willingness of central banks to deliver insurance cuts.

This relatively optimistic view on GDP is a key input into our oil demand models. EMs with structurally positive demand trends drive our forecast of 1.4mb/d 2024Q4-Q4 growth, including China (450kb/d), India (300kb/d), the Middle East (150kb/d), and other non-OECD Asia (200kb/d).

Exhibit 8: We Look for Firm 2024 Oil Demand Growth in EMs

Source: IEA, Kpler, JODI, EIA, National Sources, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

By product, we forecast another year of solid jet fuel demand growth of 0.6mb/d, and a pickup in growth for the petchem oriented LPG and naphtha products to 0.5mb/d (Exhibit 9). We still see some room for post-pandemic recovery in international Asia flights, with global jet fuel demand in 2023Q3 still 0.7mb/d below its 2019Q3 level. We expect demand for petchem-oriented products to re-accelerate towards its solid structural trend as the destocking headwind fades with a normalization in inventory-to-sales ratios and interest rates.

Exhibit 9: We Expect Jet Fuel and Petrochemical Products (LPG & Naphtha) to Drive Solid 2024 Demand Growth of 1.6mb/d

Source: IEA, JODI, EIA, National Sources, ICIS, Kpler, Haver Analytics, ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Deficit Driver #2: Slowing US Supply Growth

We expect supply growth outside core OPEC to slow down to 1.5mb/d in 2024 (from 2.6mb/d in 2023).

We especially look for a moderation in total liquids supply growth in the US to 530kb/d (vs. 1.4mb/d), and Brazil to 220kb/d (vs. 0.4mb/d). Despite this slowdown, the Americas are set to continue to drive global supply growth in 2024 with accelerations in Guyana (180kb/d), and Canada (150kb/d).

Exhibit 10: We Forecast a Moderation in US Total Liquids Supply Growth to 0.5mb/d in 2024

Source: IEA, EIA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
We expect US liquids supply growth to slow for three reasons.3

First, the US oil rig count has continued its surprising descent, and is now down 21% from the late 2022 peak.

Exhibit 11: The US Rig Count Is Down 21% Since Late 2022; Public Producers Are Signaling a Production Slowdown

Source: Baker Hughes, Haver Analytics, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Second, US producers remain capital disciplined. US public independent firms are sticking to the moderate single digit growth targets announced in 2020-2021. Our energy equity analysts expect crude production growth by the independent US E&Ps under GS coverage to slow from around 235kb/d in 2023 to 135kb/d in 2024 (Exhibit 11, right panel). Reinvestment rates—capex as a share of operating cash flow—of public producers remain in a 40-60% range, well below the historical average (Exhibit 12, left panel).

Third, underlying well productivity in the Permian basin (the key US growth engine) has stopped increasing, reflecting an offset between deteriorating rock quality and improving technology (Exhibit 12, right panel).

Exhibit 12: US Public Producers Remain Capital Disciplined; Underlying Well Productivity Has Stopped Increasing

Source: Haver Analytics, Company data, Enverus, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Deficit Driver #3: Lower OPEC Supply for Longer

We believe that the OPEC+ supply cuts since late 2022 reflect a structural shift to a more assertive approach of keeping inventories low, and pursuing backwardation. 4

Because of the reduced non-OPEC supply response to production cuts, we estimate that OPEC group cuts now boost Saudi oil profits. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the other 8 OPEC+ countries, which cut production by 1.7mb/d in April, are likely to keep their group cut fully in place in 2024.

We assume that Saudi Arabia unwinds the extra 1mb/d unilateral cut only gradually starting in 2024Q3 by 0.25mb/d every two months because its appears determined to lower inventories and support elevated funding needs. Our forecast for low OPEC supply is also consistent with our statistical finding that the group is in no rush to boost production because commercial OECD stocks remain only slightly below their historical average.

Exhibit 13: Lower Saudi Crude Supply For Longer

Source: OPEC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Stress Testing the 80-100 Range

We next stress test our view that oil prices will be in a 80-100 range in 2024. We estimate the effect of three key risks on our 2024Q4 Brent forecast of \$94/bbl using our pricing framework.

Based on our assessment of the likely OPEC response, we conclude that Brent is likely to remain in or close to our 80-100 range in most risk scenarios unless OPEC became significantly less assertive (downside price risk), or if OPEC is prevented from deploying its spare capacity (tail upside price risk).

n Moderate recession (-\$17/bbl under OPEC response): This scenario assumes a moderate OECD recession starting in 2024Q1, lasting 4 quarters, with spillovers to non-OECD economies.5 In this scenario, we think that key OPEC+ countries—Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq—would likely not gradually raise production (as our baseline assumes). If output from these 5 countries stays flat at its 2023Q4 level, then Brent would be \$17 lower than in our baseline, and reach \$77/bbl in 2024Q4. If OPEC+ output were to rise in line with our baseline supply outlook despite a recession, then 2024Q4 Brent would be \$31 lower at \$62/bbl.

Non OPEC supply beats again (-\$12/bbl under OPEC response): This scenario assumes that global supply excluding core OPEC, Iraq, and Russia, Iran beats our expectations in 2024 by the same magnitude as in 2023. In this scenario, extensions of the extra Saudi cut through 2024 and the group cut announced in April 2023 through 2025Q1 appear likely. On net, we estimate that Brent would then be \$12 lower than in our baseline, and reach \$82/bbl in 2024Q4. If OPEC+ output were to rise in line with our baseline supply outlook, we estimate that 2024Q4 Brent would be \$19 lower at \$74/bbl.

Supply disruptions (+\$5/bbl under OPEC response): This scenario assumes a 0.5mb/d rise in unplanned production disruptions to the 2011-2023 average of 1.8mb/d starting in 2024Q1.6 In this scenario, we think that Saudi Arabia may start unwinding its extra cut in 2024Q2 (vs. our 2024Q3 baseline). On net, we estimate that Brent would be \$5 higher than in our baseline, and reach \$99/bbl in 2024Q4. Combining these disruptions and our baseline supply path would imply \$8/bbl of upside with 2024Q4 Brent at \$102/bbl.

Exhibit 14: The OPEC Response Is Likely to Keep Prices in a 80-100 Range

Source: ICE, Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

While we see a severe supply downside risk scenario, such as a potential interruption of trade through the Strait of Hormuz, as highly unlikely, the resulting rally would likely be sizable. Specifically, we estimate that oil prices in this tail scenario where core OPEC cannot deploy its spare capacity initially rise 20% above our baseline in the first month of interruption, and may temporarily double in the much less likely scenario of an extended disruption.

Refining’s Catch-22

While there is ample spare capacity in upstream crude oil production, the downstream refining system remains the tightest sector of the oil industry, implying persistently elevated refined product margins and timespreads.

Structural Tightness

We estimate that the current global refining utilization rate of 85% sits in percentile 90 of its historical distribution (Exhibit 15), and 3-4 p.p. above the mid-cycle norms.

Exhibit 15: The Refining System Is Structurally Tight

Source: IEA, BP, IIR, OGJ, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
This structural tightness reflects four key factors.

First, 7mb/d of disruptions and pandemic-related closures since the late 2010s have depressed refining capacity. Second, demand for refined products has reached an all time high. Third, more frequent weather-related disruptions, and the divergence between the quality of crude supply and the type of refined products in demand are straining the system in unusual ways.

Fourth, the combination of elevated long-run demand uncertainty and the very long cycle of refining investments has limited investment in new refineries. In fact, we estimate that the median DM refinery is now 50 years old, with payback periods of more than two decades. While high prices usually tend to cure high prices, the duration mismatch between investment and returns precludes such a natural rebalancing. This dynamic–refining’s Catch-22—will likely cement a refining bull market until EV-penetration scales significantly.

Against this structurally tight refining backdrop, we expect only modest incremental easing over 2024-2025. Although 1.8/1.4mb/d of net capacity additions (revised +0.1/+0.1) still outweigh the 1.4/0.9mb/d growth expected in refined product demand (+0.1/+0.4) over this period, we now look for less incremental easing than previously. And even under our forecast of an 84.6% utilization rate in 2025, the system remains vulnerable to further delays in capacity additions that remain concentrated in EMs with a history of delays and operational challenges.

The combination of refining tightness and the distortion of demand across products implies ongoing divergence in refinery margins. We expect complex refiners to be rewarded for production of premium products in high demand (gasoline, diesel), while simple refiners earn lower margins on producing surplus naphtha (a petrochemical feedstock) and fuel oil in low demand. We therefore think that today’s low complex refining margins (below the 2015-19 average) in multiple regions are not sustainable and will pick up.

Exhibit 16: We Expect a Return to a Divergent Margin Environment that Rewards Complex Refiners Simple Singapore and complex US Gulf Coast refining margins adjusted for slate, yield, freight, processing costs (USD/bbl). Dashed lines are 2015-19 average

Source: ICE, CME, DME, Platts, Refinitiv Eikon, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Higher Summer Gasoline Refinery Margins

We are constructive on gasoline refinery margins, and neutral on diesel margins.

Global gasoline refinery margins have bounced in recent weeks from cost support, assisted by yield-switching to diesel, as we had expected. A recovery in currently depressed gasoline positioning is likely to further boost gasoline refinery margins.

We maintain our cal24/25 gasoline-Brent crack forecasts at \$13/10 (NW European EBOB) and \$18/16/bbl (US RBOB), respectively, as the bearish incorporation of the lighter slate (increasing gasoline supply) offsets bullish inventory declines. Our gasoline refinery margins forecasts remain well above the 2019 averages of \$7/8/bbl, respectively. We thus continue to recommend long positions in summer gasoline margins, when we expect octane constraints to once again dictate significant price upside. We prefer to express length in European product cracks, given our continued bearish view on Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), that are baked into US refined product prices.

Relatedly, we also expect US retail gasoline/diesel prices to follow this rise in wholesale prices, rising to \$3.87/4.28/gal in Summer 2024 from \$3.5/gal currently.

Turning to diesel, we see only modest value in (European) diesel cracks at current levels, which have converged to our forecasts. The reason is that the demand hit from warm winter weather and long positioning remain significant headwinds to initiating length, especially in US heating oil. We maintain our cal24/25 North Western European Gasoil and US Heating Oil-Brent crack forecasts at \$25/22 and \$29/26/bbl respectively, as the bullish incorporation of the lightening slate (reducing distillate and residue supply) offsets the bearish milder winter weather. Nevertheless, low inventories, high utilization rates, expensive freight, a lighter slate, and high global natural gas prices will diesel keep cracks significantly wider than their 2019 averages of \$16/18/bbl respectively.

Exhibit 17: While Upside is Limited Over Winter, We See Significant Value in Summer Gasoline Grades
NW European EBOB Gasoline-Brent Crack fair value model vs spot and forward curve (USD/bbl)

Source: CME, Platts, ICE, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
NW European Low Sulfur Gasoil-Brent Crack fair value model vs spot and forward curve (USD/bbl)

Exhibit 18: We See Only Modest Upside to Current Distillate Forwards in Europe

Source: ICE, Platts, CME, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Exhibit 19: Octane Constraints Will Once Again Drive Most of the Upside We See Next Summer Octane values (USD/bbl per RON in 78-93 range). Dashed lines are forecasts.

Source: Platts, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Top Trades

We currently recommend three trades in the oil complex.

OPEC Range (Jun24 Brent contract: Short 80 put, Long 90/100 call spread, Net premium upfront: \$5.1/bbl)

We believe oil prices remain range-bound, with a c.\$80/bbl floor supported by OPEC exerting renewed pricing power, while ample OPEC spare capacity provides a \$100/bbl ceiling. Because much of the Brent forward curve sits below this floor, we also initiate a long call spread to express our constructive view. This trade benefits from the high current implied volatility and backwardation in the Brent futures curve. To profit from the recent sell-off and collapse in call-skew, we buy back the \$95/bbl call (for \$2.15/bbl), to protect against upside tail losses, rather that recommending additional extreme tail hedges.

2024 Deficits (Long Aug24/Sep24 Brent timespread. Last close: \$0.30/bbl)

Current Brent futures curve pricing reflects expectations of relatively loose 1H24 balances and no/a limited OPEC response. We recommend initiating length in Aug24 versus Sep24 Brent timespreads, as our Brent forecast peaks in August 2024, a few months before our forecast for OECD commercial inventories bottoms in December 2024.

Summer Gasoline Tightness (Long Sum-24 EBOB Gasoline-Brent cracks. Last close: \$11.5/bbl)

Beyond underlying refining constraints, gasoline faces the additional issue of secondary unit constraints (isomeration units, alkylation units, reformers) that limit the ability to produce high-octane gasoline blending components, required for summer gasoline specifications. Although these constraints did bind in 2022 and 2023, market forwards do not reflect a repeat despite limited investment to prevent a repetition. We also forecast solid gasoline demand as the outlook for the global consumer remains healthy with the fall in core inflation and full employment.

Exhibit 20: Our Recommended OPEC Range Trade Generates Profits above \$75/bbl Payoff profile using current market prices from a three-way Jun-24 Brent option strategy: Short \$80 put, Long \$90/100 call spread

This is equivalent to our previously recommended strategy after buying back the \$95/bbl call
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Forecasts Appendix

Our detailed monthly supply-demand and inventory balances are on the GS research portal here, and summarized by Exhibit 21.

Exhibit 21: We Forecast Annual Average 2024 Forecasts for Brent and WTI of \$92 and 87 Per Barrel

GS Forecasts
Brent WTI
2023	83 78
2024	92 87
2025	92 88
4Q23	84 80
1Q24	86 82
2Q24	92 88
3Q24	95 90
4Q24	94 89
1Q25	92 88
2Q25	92 88
3Q25	92 88
4Q25	92 88
Nov-23	81 76
Dec-23	83 79
Jan-24	84 80
Feb-24	86 82
Mar-24	88 84
Apr-24	90 86
May-24	92 88
Jun-24	94 89
Jul-24	95 90
Aug-24	95 91
Sep-24	95 90
Oct-24	94 90
Nov-24	94 89
Dec-24	93 89

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Exhibit 22: GS Product retail price, wholesale flat price, and crack (vs Brent) forecasts Values represent realised and forecasted values of swaps expiries. Realised values in italics. Full monthly forecasts are available in the Appendix.

	Productcracks vsBrentcrude (USD/bbl) NW Europe								Product flatprice (USD/bbl) NW Europe								(USD/gal)		(USD/bbl)
	Gasoline		Gasoil		Gasoline		US (New York) Heating oil		Gasoline GS		Gasoil		US (New York) Gasoline		Heating oil		Brent Crude oil		United States No2Diesel Gasoline		RIN Cost
	GS	Forwards	GS	Forwards	GS	Forwards	GS Forwards		Forwards	GS	Forwards	GS	Forwards	GS	Forwards	GS	Forwards		Retail	Retail 3.78	GS
1Q22	12 34	12	25	25	20	20	30	30	109	109	123 160	123 160	117 154	117	128 169	128 169	97	97	4.29		6.1
2Q22		34	48	48	43	43	58	58	146	146		144		154	149	149	112	112 98	5.48	4.60	7.1
3Q22	16	16	47	47	24	24	51	51	114	114	144		122	122			98		5.16	4.19	7.8
4Q22	11	11	50	50	16	16	60	60	99	99	139	139	104	104	149	149	89	89	5.06	3.69	7.9
1Q23	14	14	32	32	23	23	41	41	96	96	114	114	106	106	123	123	82	82	4.40	3.49	7.9
2Q23 3Q23	22	22	18	18	31	31	25	25	100	100	96	96	109	109	103	103 127	78	78	3.94	3.69	7.4
4Q23	27	27	34	34	29	29	41	41	112	112	120	120	114 97	114	127		86	86	4.27	3.87	7.2
	8	7	31	36	10	10	35	42	95	97	118	125		99	122	131	87	89	4.36	3.58	4.6
1Q24 2Q24	8	6	25	30	15	14	29	36	98	92	115	116	105	100	119	122	90	86	4.26	3.60	4.3
	19	12	23	27	26	20	26	31	113	97	118	111	121	105	121	116	94	84	4.25	3.91	4.2
3Q24 4Q24	17	11	25	26	20	16	29	32	111	94	119	109	114	99	123	115	94	83	4.29	3.81	3.9 3.7
1Q25	9 6	4	27 25	26	9	10	30	32	101	86	119 117	108 102	102 105	91	123	114 109	93	82 81	4.27 4.20	3.56 3.56	3.9
2Q25	14		20	22 22	13 23	13 19	28 23	28 27	98 106		112	101	115	93 99	120 115	107	92	80	4.09	3.81	4.2
3Q25	13		21		18	16			105				110	94	117	107	92	79	4.15	3.72	4.6
4Q25	6		22	21 21	9	9	25 26	28 28	98		113 114			87	118	106	92 92	78	4.17	3.55	5.0
2022	18	18	43									101			149	149
	18	17	29	43 30	26 23	26 23	50 35	50 37	117 101	117 141 101 112	141 114	124 107	107	124	119 121		99 83	99 84	5.00 4.24	4.06 3.66	7.2 6.8
2023 2024	13 10

Source: ICE, CME, Platts, EIA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Disclosure Appendix

Reg AC

We, Daan Struyven, Callum Bruce, CFA, Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby and Blake Woods, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views, which have not been influenced by considerations of the firm’s business or client relationships.

Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs’ Global Investment Research division.

Disclosures

Option Specific Disclosures

Price target methodology: Please refer to the analyst’s previously published research for methodology and risks associated with equity price targets.

Pricing Disclosure: Option prices and volatility levels in this note are indicative only, and are based on our estimates of recent mid-market levels(unless otherwise noted). All prices and levels exclude transaction costs unless otherwise stated.

General Options Risks – The risks below and any other options risks mentioned in this research report pertain both to specific derivative trade recommendations mentioned and to discussion of general opportunities and advantages of derivative strategies. Unless otherwise noted, options strategies mentioned in this report may be a combination of the strategies below and therefore carry with them the risks of those strategies.

Buying Options - Investors who buy call (put) options risk loss of the entire premium paid if the underlying security finishes below (above) the strike price at expiration. Investors who buy call or put spreads also risk a maximum loss of the premium paid. The maximum gain on a long call or put spread is the difference between the strike prices, less the premium paid.

Selling Options - Investors who sell calls on securities they do not own risk unlimited loss of the security price less the strike price. Investors who sell covered calls (sell calls while owning the underlying security) risk having to deliver the underlying security or pay the difference between the security price and the strike price, depending on whether the option is settled by physical delivery or cash-settled. Investors who sell puts risk loss of the strike price less the premium received for selling the put. Investors who sell put or call spreads risk a maximum loss of the difference between the strikes less the premium received, while their maximum gain is the premium received.

For options settled by physical delivery, the above risks assume the options buyer or seller, buys or sells the resulting securities at the settlement price on expiry.

Regulatory disclosures

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See company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior periods; directorships; for equity securities, market making and/or specialist role. Goldman Sachs trades or may trade as a principal in debt securities (or in related derivatives) of issuers discussed in this report.

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This research is for our clients only. Other than disclosures relating to Goldman Sachs, this research is based on current public information that we consider reliable, but we do not represent it is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied on as such. The information, opinions, estimates and forecasts contained herein are as of the date hereof and are subject to change without prior notification. We seek to update our research as appropriate, but various regulations may prevent us from doing so. Other than certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst’s judgment.

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Our salespeople, traders, and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and principal trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research. Our asset management area, principal trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.

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This research is focused on investment themes across markets, industries and sectors. It does not attempt to distinguish between the prospects or performance of, or provide analysis of, individual companies within any industry or sector we describe.

Any trading recommendation in this research relating to an equity or credit security or securities within an industry or sector is reflective of the investment theme being discussed and is not a recommendation of any such security in isolation.

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2024 Outlook: Robust Returns in the OPEC Range

The OPEC Range

A \$80 Floor Under Brent

A \$100 Cap on Brent

A Moderate Deficit in 2024

Deficit Driver #1: Robust Demand Growth

Deficit Driver #2: Slowing US Supply Growth

Deficit Driver #3: Lower OPEC Supply for Longer

Stress Testing the 80-100 Range

Refining’s Catch-22

Structural Tightness

Higher Summer Gasoline Refinery Margins

Top Trades

2024 Deficits (Long Aug24/Sep24 Brent timespread. Last close: \$0.30/bbl)

Summer Gasoline Tightness (Long Sum-24 EBOB Gasoline-Brent cracks. Last close: \$11.5/bbl)

Forecasts Appendix

Disclosure Appendix

Reg AC

Disclosures

Option Specific Disclosures

Regulatory disclosures

Disclosures required by United States laws and regulations

Additional disclosures required under the laws and regulations of jurisdictions other than the United States

Global product; distributing entities

General disclosures

© 2023 Goldman Sachs.

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高盛+2024年石油展望：欧佩克投资区间的强劲回报-英-24页-WN11